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ERIC SONG

Othello and the Political Theology of Jealousy

E

ven as attention to political theology has energized Renaissance studies, that category has proven nebulous enough to require repeated
clariﬁcation. That politics and Christian theology have informed one another in Western history goes without saying. To provide a more useful
working deﬁnition of “political theology,” Graham Hammill and Julia
Reinhard Lupton appeal to “a crisis in religion” as revealed “in the moments where religion is no longer working—but neither are the secular
solutions designed to replace it.”1 Under this deﬁnition, the term designates a pattern of breakdowns and renegotiations that links ostensibly
secular modernity to a religious past. Carl Schmitt’s dictum, “All signiﬁcant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts,” has circulated widely because it justiﬁes a certain kind of
genealogical investigation against the possible charges of anachronistic
thinking.2 Yet Schmitt’s political leanings (including his ties to the Nazi
party and to fascism more broadly) have motivated scholars to show that
politico-theological inquiry does not amount to an intellectual alibi for
modern authoritarianism.
Literary writings serve as an important conduit through which older
religious and political modes—of thinking, venerating, and feeling—have
1. Graham Hammill and Julia Reinhard Lupton, “Introduction,” in Political Theology and Early
Modernity (Chicago, 2012), 1.
2. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, tr. George Schwab
(Chicago, 2005), 35–36. For a taxonomy of so-called “weak” versus “strong” appeals to political
theology, see Anselm Haverkamp, “Richard II, Bracton, and the End of Political Theology,” Law
and Literature 16.3 (2004), 313–26; Jennifer R. Rust, “Political Theology and Shakespeare Studies,”
Literature Compass 6 (2009), 175–90. Whereas the “weak” version of political theology is primarily
historicist in orientation and tends to be afﬁliated with the work of Ernst Kantorowicz, the “strong”
view discerns latent connections between earlier political theology and modernity, in the way that
Schmitt underwrites. I ﬁnd this kind of taxonomy unhelpful to the extent that it participates in
not just the recuperation but also the elevation of Schmitt as a singularly brilliant anti-liberal thinker.
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been transmitted into modernity. In Hamlet or Hecuba (1956), Schmitt himself turned to literature as a focus of politico-theological inquiry, attempting to conscript Shakespearean tragedy for his view of history. Schmitt
grounds Hamlet’s aesthetic value squarely in political reality. The tragedy
can remain durably powerful long after its time because of the “genuine
intrusions [Einbrüche]” of history in the play.3 These intrusions refer to incendiary topics concerning James’s legitimacy as the future English monarch; the scandalous past of his mother, Mary, Queen of Scots; and her
eventual execution as authorized by Queen Elizabeth I. Such matters
could not be handled directly, but their presence is nonetheless felt as taboos that energize the play. By advancing a political understanding of taboo while rejecting a psychoanalytic one, Schmitt claims that historical
matters serve as the “objective reality of the tragic action.”4 Because this
objective reality is expressed but also occluded as taboo, it does not become inert over time as overt topical allusions might. By reading Hamlet
in this way, Schmitt works to subordinate the play’s tragic power to a supposedly objective historical narrative—one that looks ahead to the inadequacies of Stuart kingship and, beyond, to the advent of modern state
power.
Scholars have worked to show that the politico-theological signiﬁcance of artistic creativity should not be subordinated to such a tendentious view. Graham Hammill, for example, argues that Moses’ transmission of Yahweh’s laws to the Israelites serves as a paradigm for “the
constitutive role of imagination,” which is indispensable for establishing
and maintaining any form of political authority.5 Hammill details how
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century thinkers explore this constitutive
role—and not merely to afﬁrm the legitimacy of power but rather to express conﬂicting values, including republican freedom versus monarchical authority, and toleration versus religious exclusion. Victoria Kahn argues (in part through a critical engagement with Schmitt’s Hamlet or
Hecuba) for a more decisive break with religion in the name of a secular
poeisis. Fantasy and illusion remain indispensable for governance and social cohesion, but art, Kahn argues, is a more salutary form of making
3. Carl Schmitt, Hamlet or Hecuba: The Intrusion of the Time into the Play, tr. David Pan and
Jennifer R. Rust (Candor, 2009), 25.
4. Schmitt, Hecuba, 45.
5. Graham Hammill, The Mosaic Constitution: Political Theology from Machiavelli to Milton (Chicago, 2012), 11.
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when freed from its politico-theological entanglements. A challenge that
both Hammill and Kahn confront is to explain how an understanding of
political theology might remain not just relevant, but relevant in a way
that disrupts the modern state’s ability to arrogate religious energies for
its own purposes. Hammill, even while embarking on a study of what
he calls the Mosaic constitution, acknowledges that “[w]hether or not
Hebrew scripture plays a similar role nowadays” as it did for earlier thinkers “may be an open question.”6 Both Hammill and Kahn eventually
turn to Freud as a central ﬁgure in transmitting the politico-theological
concerns of the Hebrew Bible into modernity. As Kahn advances her argument that secular poeisis is valuable because it “interprets our fantasies
in a form that liberates rather than constrains,” she must work around the
fact that neither modern art nor Freud’s attempt to demystify religious
illusion managed to break the spell of twentieth-century fascism.7
This essay seeks to advance our understanding of how the aesthetic
and affective work of early modern tragedy communicates politicotheological meaning, but in a way that disrupts the claims of state power.
More speciﬁcally, this essay revisits Othello as a work that reshapes the
biblical concept of jealousy into a plot that retains its air of religious profundity even while upending a supernatural understanding of causation.
Jealousy persists within the supposedly universal claims of Christian love
to exacerbate tensions between exclusivity and inclusivity, between personal intimacy and communal belonging. In Othello, jealousy serves as
the dramatic vehicle of a politico-theological problem that neither religion nor the state can resolve. My argument builds upon the readings of
Othello offered by Julia Reinhard Lupton and Christopher Pye.8 For Lupton, Othello’s status as a circumcised convert locates on his body a resistance to full assimilation. This incomplete assimilation reveals not just
the typological problem of relating spirit to ﬂesh but also the contradiction between Christian universalism and narrower citizenship. Whereas
Lupton focuses on Othello’s particularity as a residual problem, Pye argues
that Othello’s anomalous standing in Venetian society looks to the future

6. Hammill, 7.
7. Victoria Kahn, The Future of Illusion: Political Theology and Early Modern Texts (Chicago,
2014), 177.
8. See Julia Reinhard Lupton, Citizen-Saints: Shakespeare and Political Theology (Chicago, 2005),
105–23; Christopher Pye, The Storm at Sea: Political Aesthetics in the Time of Shakespeare (New York,
2015), 105–24.
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by anticipating the modern aesthetic subject. Othello, like the modern
subject, claims for his own experiences a privilege apart from law. In Pye’s
account, jealousy motivates Othello to confuse what are really aesthetic
experiences for empirical evidence of Desdemona’s unfaithfulness. The
tragic outcome, however, reveals that the so-called aesthetic subject is
always truly enmeshed in the workings of state power and the law.
While engaging with the insights of these readings, this essay proposes
that the full politico-theological signiﬁcance of Othello has remained
partly hidden in plain sight. Othello likely remains the single most inﬂuential depiction of conjugal jealousy in the English language. By revisiting
the multilayered portrayal of jealousy as a problem for Othello, for Christian marriage in general, and for the interlace of personal lives and state
power, I aim to show how the tragedy locates politico-theological meaning within intimate experiences. I take up Eric Santner’s proposition that
“there is more political theology in everyday life than we might have ever
thought.”9 It would be beyond the scope of this essay to trace the ways
that Othello and its adaptations have shaped our understanding of jealousy as a phenomenon in everyday lives. This essay concludes instead
with a discussion of one speciﬁc way that Othello looks ahead to our concerns with political theology. Othello, I argue, resists Schmitt’s attempt
to conscript Shakespearean tragedy for his view of political history.
Othello’s fate suggests that the harmonization of personal intimacy and
communal belonging requires the auspices of state power; the state, by
contrast, can ﬂourish even when personal love becomes untenable. By
registering this conclusion as a tragedy, however, Othello works to deny
the state any affectively binding celebration of its own perpetuation and
future development. Othello teaches us that the artistic work of shaping a
politico-theological impasse into an artistic encounter can thwart a teleological narrative of state power precisely when that narrative claims to
speak in the name of historical reality.
II

At the end of Othello, the tragic hero recounts the error that led him to
murder his wife. Othello likens himself to “the base Indian” (according
to the 1622 First Quarto edition of the play) or to “the base Iudean”
9. Eric L. Santner, The Royal Remains: The People’s Two Bodies and the Endgames of Sovereignty
(Chicago, 2011), 46.
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(according to the First Folio) who “threw a pearl away / Richer than all
his tribe” (5.2.347–48).10 This well-known crux has presented two related ways—religious and ethnic—in which Othello understands his descent into murderous jealousy.11 If Othello likens himself to the “base
Indian,” he appeals to a form of ignorance afﬁliated with racial difference;
the effects of that difference have persisted in spite of his conversion
and admission into Venetian society. The First Folio’s “Iudean” locates
Othello’s downfall within a scriptural framework, likening him either
to Herod the Judaean or to Judas Iscariot. Only an allusion to the story
of Herod would offer a direct link to an earlier conjugal tragedy. Herod is
lured by Salome into suspecting his wife Mariamne and ordering her
execution. Early editors such as Alexander Pope and Lewis Theobald
preferred this interpretation as they continued to rely on the Fourth Folio
text and the “Iudean” variant.12 The other readings, which have since
gained prominence, do not allude to an earlier conjugal narrative. Instead, they describe wrongheaded or venal judgment concerning value:
the Indian cannot fathom the worth of the pearl, while Judas Iscariot betrays Christ for thirty pieces of silver.
These interpretive possibilities can all speak to Othello’s condition because his marriage exhibits a highly speciﬁc version of a general problem
concerning personal worth—not the worth of a Christian wife but rather
that of a Christian husband in his wife’s esteem. In the epistle to the Ephesians, Paul redeﬁnes marriage as an index of Christ’s love for the Church.
This teaching places a burden upon husbands to love their wives “even as
Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it” (Eph. 5.25).13 Yet
Paul’s exhortation leaves it unclear how or why any wife should esteem
a particular would-be husband—who is himself imperfect and in need of
salvation—in this way. Unlike any mere husband, Christ renders his bride
worthy of marriage by sacriﬁcing his own body to redeem her. William
Gouge, in the 1622 treatise Of Domesticall Duties, upholds husbandly prerogative by emphasizing the metaphorical quality of Paul’s teaching:
10. Qtd. from The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. Blakemore Evans and J.J.M. Tobin, 2nd ed.
(Boston, 1996), 1288–96. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from Shakespeare’s plays are taken
from this edition and will hereafter be cited parenthetically by act, scene, and line numbers.
11. See Arthur Freeman, “ ‘Base Indian’: V.ii.347,” Shakespeare Quarterly 13 (1962), 256–57;
Richard Levin, “The Indian/Iudean Crux in Othello,” Shakespeare Quarterly 33 (1982), 60–67; and
Lupton, Citizen-Saints, 118–20.
12. See A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare, Vol. VI: Othello, ed. Horace Howard Furness
(Philadelphia, 1886), 327n421.
13. All quotations from the Bible are from the 1611 Authorized Version.
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“The note of comparison (*Even as) requireth no equality, as if it were
possible for an Husband in that measure to loue his wife, as Christ loued
his Church.”14 Gouge admits that husbands are not truly Christ-like only
to insist that wives should submit nonetheless. Because Paul’s teaching relies on a simile, the relationship between husband and wife does not need
to reﬂect Christ’s redemptive love in any perfect way. When it comes to
the metaphorical or even ﬁctive core of Pauline marriage, Gouge warns
his reader to “conceive no carnall, no earthly thing of it, because it is a
mysterie.”15
Othello, however, desires to manifest real rather than mysteriously imputed merit; from beginning to end, he wishes to be revealed as he truly is.
After Iago’s machinations render him unﬁt as a husband, Othello struggles
to reconcile his lack of merit with his sense of heroic self-worth. Insofar as
Othello likens himself to an ignorant Indian, he deﬂects the central question of his own worth by emphasizing Desdemona’s inestimable value. If
Othello likens himself to Judas Iscariot, the implied comparison of Desdemona to Christ emphasizes how un-Christ-like Othello has been. In
either case, Desdemona’s greater worth has ended up stymieing Othello’s
quest to be honestly good. His ﬁnal recourse is an act of self-sacriﬁce.
Yet even if Othello narrates his suicide as an act of service to Christian
Venice, he reafﬁrms his inability to make himself worthy of Desdemona’s
love by redeeming her. Ideally, the irresolvable problem of personal merit
within Pauline marriage should energize a dynamism between individual
and collective identities. A wife should esteem her husband as being like
Christ so that their imperfect marriage can point towards a higher truth.
A husband should occupy his Christ-like role even while thinking of
himself, paradoxically, as a member of Christ’s corporate bride. Even if
such teachings are mysterious, they are—as a homilist like Gouge advises—meant to be tenable. Jealousy, however, is the vehicle that drives
Othello and Desdemona’s Christian marriage to catastrophe. Even though
marriage should have completed Othello’s assimilation into the Christian community of Venice, it ends up exposing that incorporation as
imperfect.
The persistence of jealousy within Christian marriage contains a politicotheological potential; this is the potential that Othello activates for its dramatic
purposes. In the Hebrew Bible, jealousy binds intimate and theological
14. William Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties: Eight Treatises (1622), 44.
15. Gouge, 125.
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concerns together within a political formation. In the Second Commandment, Yahweh forbids Israel from the worship of idols by declaring himself
a jealous God. John Calvin’s commentary on this passage (as a 1561 English
translation renders it) likens God’s “feruently burnyng ialousie” to the anger of a husband “yf he see his wiues minde encline to a strang louer.”16
Within the broader context of the Hebrew Bible, the liberty that Calvin’s
gloss takes is certainly not unwarranted. “Monotheistic theology,” Regina
M. Schwartz observes, “is obsessed with the possibility and actuality of betrayal,” in such a way that “desire for God and human desire are made analogues of one another.”17 In the Book of Hosea, to cite one memorable
example, the prophet’s experience of marriage to an unchaste woman reﬂects Yahweh’s love for his chosen but wayward nation.
Christian teaching would go on to develop an endorsement of exclusivity while distancing itself from the forms of polygamy and concubinage
described in the Hebrew Bible.18 Normative monogamy turns the dynamism between individual experience and corporate truth (as contained
within the Pauline deﬁnition of marriage) into a more pronounced tension between exclusivity and inclusivity. For Calvin, Christians should
apply divine jealousy towards an afﬁrmation of God’s exclusive relationship with an elect Church. John Donne’s Holy Sonnet XVIII offers
a memorably different view, one that favors inclusion at the expense of
mandated exclusivity. For Donne, the existence of embattled Christian
denominations is cause for indecision and lament. His sonnet expresses
this lament by widening the disparity between the earthly experience
of marriage and the higher meaning of Christ’s love. Jealousy lies at the
heart of this disjunction. When Donne describes Christ’s bride as “most
true, and pleasing to [him], then, / When she is embraced and open to
most men,” he scandalizes the sense that Christian marriage should be
based on sexual ﬁdelity.19 Even though exclusivity remains a central feature of marriage, Donne renders jealousy inappropriate for conveying the
highest meaning of Christian love.
16. John Calvin, The Institution of the Christian Religion, tr. Thomas Norton (1561), 2.51.
17. Regina M. Schwartz, The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism (Chicago, 1997), 140.
18. For a recent discussion of the possibility of sanctioning polygamy resurfacing during the
Reformation, see Carmen Nocentelli, Empires of Love: Europe, Asia, and the Making of Early Modern
Identity (Philadelphia, 2013), 95–101. Nocentelli argues that contact with polygamous cultures in
Asia led Europeans to reinforce Christian monogamy.
19. Qtd. from The Variorum Edition of the Poetry of John Donne: The Holy Sonnets, ed. Gary A.
Stringer and Paul A. Parrish, vol. 7, part 1 (Bloomington, 2005), 19.
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The tension between exclusive marriage and inclusive Christian love
becomes more directly political in any society that confers legitimacy
through birthright. In Jacobean England, marriage’s function in regulating reproduction was restored to its highest level. James, in contrast to his
unmarried predecessor, ascended to the English throne married and the
father of heirs. He soon worked to harmonize the political utility and
the spiritual meanings of marriage. As Ernst Kantorowicz has reminded
us, James declared before parliament in 1603, “What God hath conjoined
then, let no man separate. I am the husband, and all the whole island is my
lawful wife.”20 Kantorowicz describes James’s rhetoric as adapting a belief
in the corpus mysticum, the union between Christ and the Church. Yet
James’s actual, earthly marriage did not necessarily help to promote a view
of him as an exemplar of Christian love. As Alan Stewart recounts in his
biography of James, the Scottish King had candidly described his decision
to marry in 1589 as a practical matter, a political choice designed to refute
what he called the “great jealousy”—not of inﬁdelity but rather of his
“inability” to produce an heir.21 As the Queen consort, Anna had been
suspected of playing a role in the Gowrie conspiracy, which led to reports
of “an open difﬁdence” between the royal couple as well as their “very
evil menage.”22 Once James and Anna became English monarchs, rumors
intensiﬁed about Anna’s Catholic leanings, political machinations, and
sexual inﬁdelities. James’s own dalliances were also widely rumored.
III

Othello was likely composed in 1603, the same year as James’s English
coronation. Yet the play does not concern the functions of marriage in
hereditary monarchy but is rather set in republican Venice. Shakespeare’s
second great play of jealousy would go on to treat monarchy directly:
The Winter’s Tale (1610/11) dramatizes a king’s concern for the legitimacy
of his heirs lapsing into a mad jealousy that imperils both his marriage and
his dynastic future. We have long recognized Othello and King Leontes
as characters linked by their descents into jealousy. Pye offers a speciﬁc
way to understand Othello as anticipating the politico-theological exploration of jealousy in The Winter’s Tale. As mentioned at the outset of this
20. Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton, 1957), 223.
21. Alan Stewart, The Cradle King: A Life of James VI & I (New York, 2011), 111.
22. Stewart, 158.

104

English Literary Renaissance

essay, Pye’s reading relies on a strategic anachronism whereby Othello
is described as a proto-aesthetic subject. Othello privileges his subjective
experiences—the real basis of his mounting certainty of Desdemona’s
unfaithfulness—over juridical fact and state power. Like Othello, Leontes
also confuses what amounts to aesthetic impressions for binding empirical
proof. Yet as a monarch, Leontes has a different relationship to the law.
Pye examines Leontes’ authority in the light of Schmitt’s well-known
deﬁnition of sovereignty around the power to decree states of exception.23 Leontes possesses the power to suspend even the oracular pronouncement of his wife’s innocence, but his jealousy generates a register
of experience that undermines his sovereign power. Precisely when
Leontes exercises his decision-making power, he is exposed as deluded
and tyrannical. Whereas Othello’s jealousy, in Pye’s reading, reveals that
the subject is always bound up by state power despite its claim to autonomy, Leontes’ jealousy exposes the sovereign subject as still relying on
subjective knowledge. To avert the full implications of tragedy, a transcendent power must be available to call the sovereign into account.
Tracing the politico-theological meaning of jealousy reveals how, exactly, Othello can anticipate something like an aesthetic subjectivity. The
point is not merely to avoid anachronistic terminology but rather to describe how the tension between inclusive love and exclusion embeds
politico-theological content in affective and dramatic patterns. These patterns, in turn, reveal how Othello disrupts the ability of state power in
claiming religious energies for its own perpetuation. According to Pye’s
reading, we can ﬁnd Othello’s clearest expression of a proto-aesthetic sensibility in Montano’s description of waiting for the general’s arrival in
Cyprus: “As to throw out our eyes for brave Othello, / Even till we make
the main and th’aerial blue / An indistinct regard” (2.1.37–39). Montano’s
words reveal, according to Pye, how reality (in this case, Othello himself
as an object of perception) can vanish or dissolve into a subjective experience—not through inattention but rather through an intensity of focus.
When Othello does ﬁnally arrive on the shores of Cyprus, he describes
his own experience of the sea voyage. Although Othello has undergone
duress, he begins to translate the horizontal crossing of the seas into a vertical ascent and descent between absolutes: “And let the laboring bark
climb hills of seas / Olympus-high, and duck again as low / As hell’s from
23. See Pye, 125–41.
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heaven!” (2.1.187–89). Othello has also translated his recent voyage into
a hypothetical scenario (described in the subjunctive) in order to afﬁrm
his present satisfaction upon being reunited with Desdemona. Othello
desires to arrest time in the name of a consummated love: “If it were
now to die, / ’Twere now to be most happy” (2.1.189–90). This intensity of feeling generates within Christian marriage an imbalance between
personal experience and shared, corporate reality. Othello’s desire for
loving permanence serves as an early precondition of jealousy. Even before jealousy takes hold, his love contains the kernel of a disruptive and
antisocial effect. Othello ignores the political and military realities of the
sea voyage—and everyone else involved other than Desdemona—in order to fantasize about ﬁxity. Such solipsism clearly contrasts with Cassio’s
behavior, which manages to express joy over Turkish defeat, deep concern for Othello, and admiration for Desdemona all at once. Even
Othello comes to admit that he “prattle[s] out of fashion” (2.1.198).
We can look outside of Othello for conﬁrmation that Shakespearean
drama draws forth declarations of subjective, proto-aesthetic experiences
from the distortions that arise from frustrated conjugal love. In Cymbeline,
after being divided from her new husband Posthumus, Imogen describes
how she would have seen him off as he involuntarily set sail:
I would have broke mine eye-strings, crack’d them, but
To look upon him, till the diminution
Of space had pointed him sharp as my needle;
Nay, followed him till he had melted from
The smallness of a gnat to air, and then
Have turned mine eye and wept. (1.3.17–22)

This description serves as the later counterpart to both Montano’s and
Othello’s accounts of the sea voyage. Within Imogen’s experience, in
fact, Montano’s aesthetic sensibility and Othello’s desire for permanent
love converge. Imogen longs to have ﬁxed Posthumus in her perception
as long as possible until his disappearance. The perceptual reality of this
disappearance merges seamlessly with Imogen’s affective condition: in
her eyes, his melting away gives way to her weeping. Only after a long
series of romance digressions will Posthumus and Imogen be reunited.
At the very end of the play, husband and wife are ﬁnally able to embrace
and to freeze themselves into a visual emblem of ﬁdelity.
When Othello longs for ﬁxity on the Cypriot shore, he resorts to a
metaphorical language of succession to describe the ﬁxity of his love:
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“My soul hath her content so absolute / That not another comfort like
to this / Succeeds in unknown fate” (2.1.191–93). In the dynastic plot of
Cymbeline, the tension between permanence and succession proves more
literal. The triumph of static ﬁdelity can be achieved only because the
romance narrative has rendered the marriage of Imogen and Posthumus
unnecessary for the continuity of British sovereignty. Imogen is no longer
Cymbeline’s sole surviving heir. She is, instead, a “piece of tender air,” or
mulier—a woman whose destiny is to be a “most constant wife” (5.5.446–
49). In the handling of the Soothsayer, the motif of ﬁxed love giving way
to a vanishing but then being restored as a new ﬁdelity is reshaped into a
speciﬁcally political metaphor. Just as “the Roman eagle . . . / . . . Lessen’d
herself, and in the beams o’ th’ sun / So vanish’d,” so should “our princely
eagle / Th’imperial Caesar” reunite with “the radiant Cymbeline” (5.5.470–
75). The play concludes with this image of dynamic political union. Yet
Imogen and Posthumus themselves are free to remain static in their love
because they can exist at a partial remove from dynastic history.
Imogen’s story ends happily after a romance plot magically restores
her identity and clariﬁes her personal and political roles. Othello, by contrast, begins his story as a hero whose new marriage should harmonize his
personal merit with his communal belonging. Recent scholarship has attended to the way Othello and Desdemona’s marriage mirrors Ruggiero
and Bradamante’s in Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso.24 In the Italian romance
epic, marriage had crowned the conversion of the Saracen hero to Western Christendom; Shakespeare’s tragedy subsequently upends marriage as
a vehicle of closure. This renewed attention to the literary, religious, and
racial underpinnings of Othello’s inverted romance narrative adds historical speciﬁcity to Stanley Cavell’s claim that Othello anticipates the tragic
possibilities of Cartesian skepticism. For Cavell, Othello spuriously tries
to overcome all doubt by placing “a ﬁnite woman,” Desdemona, “in
the place of God”—or, as it turns out, in the place of Christ.25 Cavell does
24. See Benedict Robinson, Islam and Early Modern English Literature: The Politics of Romance from
Spenser to Milton (New York, 2007), 71–81; Dennis Austin Britton, Becoming Christian: Race, Reformation, and Early Modern English Romance (New York, 2014), 112–41.
25. Stanley Cavell, Disavowing Knowledge in Six Plays of Shakespeare, updated ed. (Cambridge,
2003), 35, 126. Cavell reads Othello’s predicament against Descartes’ appeal to God as a guarantor
of knowledge beyond the cogito. Cavell believes that Descartes puts God in the place of an external
other in order to deﬂect the need for a human other whom we can only believe (not know for
certain) possesses a mind like our own. Cavell ﬁnds that for both Descartes and Othello, “the human problem in recognizing other human beings is the problem of recognizing another to be
Christ for oneself ” (127).
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cite A.C. Bradley to refer to Othello as “the most romantic of Shakespeare’s heroes” and Norman Rabkin to call Othello “the most Christian
of the tragic heroes.”26 Yet Cavell only glances at the cultural histories that
enable Shakespeare to channel theological and philosophical meaning
into the drama of a husband’s overreliance on his wife.
Othello, I argue, turns the supposed triumph of romance into the
grounds of an epistemological tragedy by exacerbating familiar tensions
within Christian marriage. Othello’s reliance on Desdemona is an acute
version of the problem whereby a husband is called to be Christ-like
even while knowing that this is largely untrue. The slippage between
Othello’s claim to merit and his awareness of insufﬁciency registers early
in the play, when Othello appears before the Senate to account for his
clandestine wedding. Othello testiﬁes how, upon hearing his stories of
heroism, Desdemona “wish’d / That heaven had made her such a man”
(1.3.162–63). If Desdemona had desired to be a man like Othello, she
indirectly fulﬁlls such desires by becoming his sweet warrior. Yet Desdemona may have articulated a desire not to be a man but rather to be wooed
by a man like Othello—a hypothetical (and presumably white) friend of
Othello’s. Othello explains that he interpreted Desdemona’s remark as a
coy hint and then wooed her. Even by his own account, however, love
contains the possibility of self-estrangement. The role of beloved husband
may be an open-ended ofﬁce that Othello has come to occupy.
This ﬂeeting admission eventually gives way to Othello’s fuller realization that he is not Christ-like even though he is a new Christian husband.
Othello’s dependence on his wife’s love reveals not merely the universal
defect of sin but also the pressures that beleaguer him as a black, Moorish
convert. We eventually learn alongside Iago that Cassio had played a
key role in the formation of Othello and Desdemona’s love. Cassio may
have functioned in the gap that Othello’s testimony had only suggested
as a grammatical placeholder—between Othello and “such a man” as him.
Iago overhears Desdemona describing how Cassio “came a-wooing” with
Othello and took his part when she had spoken “dispraisingly” of him
(3.3.71–72). Othello may have needed an active intercessor to win Desdemona’s love all along; the occlusion of this fact in Othello’s earlier testimony reveals the anxieties that Iago is able to exploit. As Harry Berger
observes, Cassio’s mediation in Othello and Desdemona’s love exposes
26. Cavell, 129.
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two overlapping triangles—“one formed around the practice of courtship” and the other “around a question of military discipline.”27 By the
time Iago learns of Cassio’s earlier role, he has already initiated a plot to
turn him into a target of Othello’s jealousy.
Jealousy operates in the slippage between Othello’s sense of meriting
Desdemona’s love, on the one hand, and his claim to worth as a soldier
and a Venetian citizen, on the other. The Venetian Senate does confer
legal sanction upon Othello and Desdemona’s union. The Duke is sympathetic enough to deem that his own daughter would have been won
over by Othello’s tales. Yet Shakespeare imagines Venice as lacking an
essential stake in marriage and thus lacking the affective force to provide
closure to the union it legitimizes. We can discern how Othello portrays
the Venetian government as relatively indifferent to marriage by turning
to one of Shakespeare’s source texts, Lewes Lewkenor’s 1599 English
translation of Contarini’s Commonwealth and Government of Venice. Contarini describes ducal marriages as so important that laws prevent the
Doge from marrying the daughter of a foreign prince or of a “straunger”
who has since “obtained the right and tytle of a Venetian gentleman.”28
Although a republic theoretically does not rely on dynastic marriage for
its continuity, the exclusivity of ducal marriage is, in reality, a crucial
matter. Othello dramatizes a form of marriage to an assimilated foreigner
that does not concern the Duke directly. Brabantio objects to Desdemona’s choice of a stranger, but this is a personal concern that is deemed
an interruption of the Senate’s legitimately public business. In Contarini’s
account, the Venetian nobility consider marriage to be a practical affair,
arranged “for the most part alwaies by a third person, the bride being
neuer suffered so much as to behold her future husband” until contractual
matters are settled (194). Othello and Desdemona’s marriage does not
conform to the practices of the Venetian nobility. Or, more accurately,
Othello wishes to narrate his marriage as having arisen purely from Desdemona’s personal choice; only later do we become aware that Cassio
might have brokered their union as a kind of “third person.” In this light,
Othello’s initial desire to suppress Cassio’s role and his later lapse into
27. Harry Berger, Jr., A Fury in the Words: Love and Embarrassment in Shakespeare’s Venice (New
York, 2013), 133.
28. Gasparo Contarini, The Commonwealth and Government of Venice, tr. Lewes Lewkenor
(1599), 197. All quotations from this text will hereafter be cited parenthetically by page (or, in
the preliminaries, signature) number.
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jealousy both manifest an impulse to privilege individual love over fully
public concerns.
The framing of the scene at the Venetian Senate underscores the disparity between personal and state affairs. In the brief set piece that opens act 1,
scene 3, the Duke and the senators see through a Turkish naval ruse. Venetian power expresses itself through an ability to discern rational motives
behind pretenses. Yet perhaps for this very reason, this state cannot underwrite conjugal love as an enabling ﬁction mediating between Christ’s
love and its imperfect earthly manifestations. The aftermath of this set
piece reveals the Venetian state’s lack of affective sway when it comes
to intimate and familial matters. After the Duke offers Brabantio rhyming
commonplaces of comfort, Brabantio openly mocks the Senate’s ineffectiveness when it comes to intimate rather than tactical affairs: “So let
the Turk of Cyprus us beguile, / We lose it not, so long as we can smile”
(1.3.210–11). Even though Brabantio ofﬁcially accepts his daughter’s
marriage, he still bequeaths unhappy jealousy to his new son-in-law:
“Look to her, Moor, if thou hast eyes to see; / She has deceiv’d her father,
and may thee” (1.3.292–93). Although Brabantio has just disparaged the
Senate’s lack of wisdom in personal matters, he exhorts Othello to apply
the Venetian mode of shrewd skepticism within married life. The advice
to weave the experience of love and the rational tactics of statecraft together in this way turns out to be a form of sabotage. In the course of
exploring the tension between Christian universalism and Venetian citizenship, Lupton describes Brabantio as “a type of the Jewish Christian,
uneasy with the universal fellowship promised by his faith” and desiring
to uphold “national brotherhood.”29 Brabantio’s desire for exclusivity is
not rendered obsolete by the triumph of a Christian marriage but is rather
communicated effectively to his foreign son-in-law.
IV

Under Iago’s inﬂuence, this seed of regressive suspicion grows into jealousy. The reemergence of a sensibility that should have been rendered
obsolete at both the civic and religious registers exposes the limits of
Shakespeare’s imagined republican polity. In this way, jealousy does not
merely translate a biblical concept into a dramatic plot but rather communicates a fully politico-theological impasse. Venetian authority unwittingly allows the residue of paternal jealousy to stain Christian marriage.
29. Lupton, Citizen-Saints, 107–09.
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According to Andrew Hadﬁeld, Othello follows republican theory by
dramatizing how “individual virtue . . . can only ﬂourish if nurtured
and protected by powerful state institutions.”30 Jealousy is the vehicle
through which Iago manifests himself as an “antirepublican villain.”31
Yet Othello’s tragedy does not simply reafﬁrm republican values but instead reveals the contradictions within Venetian republicanism. In response to the developing body of criticism linking Othello to early modern republicanism, Andrew Sisson has called for more attention to the
“speciﬁcally republican problematic of the citizen’s other as the functionally specialized professional”—that is, the professional solider or mercenary.32 Sisson traces a dichotomy between the ancient Roman citizensoldiery (as championed by Machiavelli) and the Venetian separation of
citizenship from a military establishment (advocated by Contarini). In Sisson’s account, Othello suffers from a distinctively Venetian inability to
perfect the transition from being a professional soldier to being a citizen.
In the terms of my argument, jealousy uncovers the religious pattern underlying the Venetian republic’s inability to assist Othello after marriage,
even though his marriage should afﬁrm his merit as a soldier-turnedcitizen. Othello cannot perfectly translate his military valor—the basis of
his civic identity—into a conviction of Christ-likeness with regard to
his wife. Deﬁned primarily by skeptical reason, Venetian authority is illequipped to provide the spiritual and affective assistance that Othello
needs to maintain the partly ﬁctive status of a Christ-like husband.
If Iago’s assault on Othello’s marriage makes him a recognizably antirepublican villain, he succeeds by turning Othello’s insecurities as an assimilated foreigner into an acute case of the discrepancy between any
husband and Christ. Nobody in the play is more aware of the question
of genuine merit than Iago. The play opens with Iago’s complaint that
Cassio has been unjustly promoted ahead of him. As Bradley has reminded
us, we have no clear way to prove or disprove Iago’s initial claim to be
more deserving than Cassio.33 Rather than making his own merit conspicuous, Iago ﬁnds ways to translate his potentially groundless professional
envy into Othello’s sexual jealousy. Othello’s sense of his own merit has
30.
31.
32.
33.
4th ed.

Andrew Hadﬁeld, Shakespeare and Republicanism (Cambridge, Eng., 2005), 216.
Hadﬁeld, Republicanism, 219.
Andrew Sisson, “Othello and the Unweaponed City,” Shakespeare Quarterly 66 (2015), 139.
See A.C. Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy: Lectures on Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, Macbeth,
(London, 2006), 158.
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already linked military standing and a claim to love; by fostering a jealous
need for singularity within Desdemona’s affections, Iago produces a discord between these private and public registers. This discord manifests itself when Othello decries the breakdown of his vocation even before receiving so-called proof of Desdemona’s inﬁdelity. Othello feels that he
can no longer occupy the role of general when he can simply imagine
“the general camp” having sex with her (3.3.345).
Iago trains Othello’s jealousy on Cassio, his lieutenant and erstwhile intercessor in love. In act 2, scene 2, Cassio unwittingly speaks to the religious logic that allows Iago to turn otherwise petty envy into the grounds
of a grave travesty. Cassio confuses his military standing for the condition
of his soul. When Iago expresses his desire to be eternally saved, Cassio
gratingly insists that “the lieutenant is to be saved before the ancient”
(2.2.10). Even as a drunken quip, this remark reveals how Iago has reshaped professional envy into a confusion between one’s military ofﬁce
and one’s spiritual condition. This travesty becomes tragic rather than farcical when Iago brings it to bear upon marriage. Pauline teaching confers
upon marriage a soteriological dimension by deﬁning it around Christ’s
sacriﬁcial love. Christ atones for the members of his mystical, corporate
body (his bride) by exposing his literal ﬂesh to divine punishment. Iago
gives the audience special access to the way he perverts this link between
atoning sacriﬁce and love. In his second soliloquy, Iago reveals a plan to
exact revenge either by cuckolding Othello or by implanting jealousy
in him:
And nothing can or shall content my soul
Till I am even’d with him, wife for wife;
Or failing so, yet that I put the Moor
At least into a jealousy so strong
That judgment cannot cure. (2.1.298–302)

The “wife for wife” retribution that Iago imagines is never actualized but
its logic haunts the play nonetheless. Iago imagines wives as interchangeable in an economy of displaced vengeance: an innocent wife is imagined
as being corrupted in a form of recompense for a perceived violation
committed by her husband. This misogynistic attitude is initially localized in Iago but proves powerful insofar as it perverts the meaning of
redemptive Christian love. Ultimately, killing will prevail over sexual
vengeance as the way to distort the soteriological meaning of Christian
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marriage. Under Iago’s inﬂuence, Othello tries to think of killing of Desdemona not only as erotically charged violence but also as a righteous
sacriﬁce. He realizes too late that his actions expose him as an unworthy
husband while elevating the innocent Desdemona to a more Christ-like
station.
In a ﬁnal irony, Othello’s excessive desire for both singular merit and
love costs him not only his marriage but also his civic and military standing. At the end of the play, Cassio “rules in Cyprus” (5.2.331). The promotion may be just recompense for what Cassio has suffered, but it is also
of a piece with the way state power prevails even when love is untenable.
Nothing in the play (not even Iago’s inexplicable description of Cassio as
“almost damn’d in a fair wife”) suggests Cassio’s commitment to love
outside of his professional bonds (1.1.21). Cassio’s dealings with the courtesan Bianca—and his willingness to mock her affections for him—suggest that he views women as instruments for satisfying his desires. Even
Cassio’s interactions with Desdemona tend to conﬁrm his instrumental
view of women as they serve his needs. Cassio’s ﬁnal promotion reveals
that Venetian power (as the play depicts it) exists a remove from the demands of Christian love and marriage. Venice is not attached to individuals through durable bonds of love but can replace them with facility.
The Senate, as we learn in act 4, had already decided to put Cassio in
Othello’s seat as governor of Cyprus. From the Senate’s viewpoint,
Othello’s tragedy may amount to a curiously unfortunate twist in a preordained replacement.
V

A form of state power relatively indifferent to love allows the tensions
within Othello’s Christian marriage to lapse into tragic jealousy. Focusing on this particular interlace of the theological, the political, and the
personal allows us to shed new light on some of the most fundamental
interpretive problems concerning the play. As we have seen, the Judaean/Indian crux in Othello’s ﬁnal speech crystallizes the way jealousy
links religious and ethnic registers of meaning. Within this crux, the invocation of the biblical “Judaean” points to ﬁgures—Herod and Judas—
who participate in the bloodshed involved in the typological imposition
of new meanings upon older ones. Herod’s massacre of the innocents reveals the new meaning of the prophetic declaration, “In Rama was there
a voice heard, lamentation, and great mourning, Rachel weeping for her
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children” (Matt. 2.18, quoting Jer. 31.15). Judas’ deadly betrayal of Christ
occasions multiple slippages in typological redeﬁnition. The gospel of
Matthew describes the thirty pieces of silver that Judas receives as the fulﬁllment of a Hebraic prophecy. Yet Matthew seems to misattribute to Jeremiah a passage from Zechariah, in which Israel values Yahweh’s prophet
at a mere thirty pieces of silver (Matt. 27.9–10; cf. Zech. 11.12–13).
Whereas Matthew suggests that the Israelite priests purchased the potter’s ﬁeld, the Book of Acts describes Judas as having done so himself
(Acts 1.18–19). Taken together, the roles of Herod and Judas in the New
Testament suggest that the typological imposition of new meaning is not
only a bloody but also a textually untidy affair.
The variants in Othello’s last speech reveal additional slippages in
translating biblical content into a different form—in this case, into a drama
of interracial romance. By the end of his speech, Othello likens himself
both to the “circumcised dog” who was Venice’s enemy and as the Venetian servant who killed the enemy (5.2.353). Lupton shows how questions
of typology underlie the tensions among Othello’s past, his new Christian
identity, and his narrower Venetian citizenship. Lupton relates Othello’s
circumcision and his suicide to the textual transmission of Christian truth.
Othello’s circumcision serves as a “reinscriptive cut” that “does not disappear into its typological sublations, instead reinstating the Hebraic function of a signature.”34 Othello’s body bears the marks of an older register
of meaning that serves as the medium of a new, ecumenical truth but
still resists full conversion. For Lupton, Othello’s ﬁnal act of bloodshedas-narration completes his incorporation into Christian Venice, but at the
expense of his life.
These potentially abstruse matters concerning bodily and textual inscription can serve as the grounds of a brisk dramatic plot because of the politicotheological meanings already contained within jealousy. In the terms of
Northrop Frye’s well-known deﬁnition of comedy, Othello’s initial achievement should allow for the reorganization of a more capacious society.35
This triumph of comic marriage should retain, in turn, the ritualistic rhythms
of renewal after death. Yet Iago keeps alive in Othello’s mind Brabantio’s
jealousy: “She did deceive her father,” Iago reminds Othello, “marrying
you” (3.3.206). Othello offers demystiﬁed reasons for the protagonist’s susceptibility to such enticement. Yet here as elsewhere, a sense of religious
34. Lupton, 121.
35. See Northrop Frye, “The Argument of Comedy,” English Institute Essays, ed. D.A. Robertson, Jr. (New York, 1949), 58–73.
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profundity still manages to persist. Othello and Desdemona’s uniquely
tragic fates play out the conﬂicting meanings of biblical marriage—the
Hebrew Bible’s conceit of Yahweh as a jealous husband as well as the
Pauline redeﬁnition of marriage as a sign of Christ’s love.
The meanings that converge on jealousy help to explain two very familiar problems arising from Othello’s plot: why Iago should be so effective in swaying Othello and why the play appeals to different and incompatible time schemes. Iago succeeds at insinuating jealousy into Othello’s
mind by offering him an alternate way to occupy a Christ-like role,
within male-male bonds rather than in marriage:
Oth.
If thou dost love me,
Show me thy thought.
Iago. My lord you know I love you (3.3.115–17).

Othello invites what Iago completes: an echo of Peter’s declarations
to Christ in the ﬁnal chapter of the Gospel of John. In that vignette,
the resurrected Christ appears to his disciples without disclosing his identity. When Christ asks, “Simon Peter, Simon son of Jonas, lovest thou
me more than these?” he insists that Peter afﬁrm his love in a leap of faith
rather than in certainty ( John 21.15). Peter repeatedly insists that Christ
already knows he loves him. Othello, however, is deluded into thinking
that his role as Iago’s general confers upon him a Christ-like position.
From a position of seeming subservience, Iago has actually made himself
the placeholder of Othello’s belief. The effects of this reversal become
apparent when Othello asks Iago to show him his thoughts as proof of
his love. In the Gospel of John, Peter has faith in Christ, who alone
can afﬁrm his love. Othello’s misplaced faith in Iago is accommodated
by a different form of transference. Whereas the putative object of this
transference remains male love (“you know I love you”), the thinly concealed awareness is suspicion of Desdemona’s unfaithfulness. For Iago,
the production of this suspicion allows him to satisfy his professional envy
of Cassio. Yet Othello’s primary concern is his wife’s unfaithfulness rather
than Cassio’s disloyalty. By the end of act 3, scene 3, the chiastic pattern—
between Othello and Iago, between military loyalty and conjugal love—is
fulﬁlled in an exchange of oaths (echoing marriage vows) that promote
Iago to lieutenant.
Even though Iago presents himself as primarily coveting military ofﬁce, he may have always been working through his own problems with

Eric Song

115

merit in relation to marriage. As Emilia suddenly discloses in act 4, Iago’s
discontent may have originated out of his own sexual jealousy. Emilia’s
revelation undercuts Iago’s presentation of sex and marriage as mere instruments for expressing his professional envy. We have no way of conﬁrming Emilia’s claim; the placeholder ﬁgure of “some eternal villain”
who allegedly made Iago jealous leaves the ultimate source of tragic causation mysterious (4.2.130). My argument suggests that this source lies
not in some villain but rather in the “eternal” (or, at least, persistent) effects of jealousy within Christian marriage. Iago does not generate but
rather merely foists existing problems of husbandly merit upon Othello.
Cavell has argued that Othello falls for Iago’s lies even though “somewhere he also knows them to be false”—in order to avoid recognizing
his dependence on Desdemona.36 To this we can add that Othello and
Iago may both be escaping the demands of Christian marriage in order
to maintain their senses of manly worth—publicly afﬁrmed in Othello’s
case, both afﬁrmed and slighted in Iago’s.
The interpretive question of Iago’s rapid success is linked, in turn, to
the exhausted and yet seemingly inexhaustible problem of Othello’s contradictory time scheme. When the play refers to an impossibly long duration, that duration is the time necessary for suspicion to be made plausible
in a jealous mind—or, in Pye’s terms, in the subjective, aesthetic experience of jealousy. When Othello’s longing for an impossible ﬁxity in love
gives way to jealousy, the entire play undergoes a temporal distortion. In
the ﬁnal act, Othello declares in the midst of his murderous madness that
Desdemona has committed “the act of shame / A thousand times” with
Cassio (5.2.211–12). The logical time scheme of the play does not make
these repeated violations possible, but jealousy creates the dilation that
makes its suspicions plausible. In Desdemona’s handkerchief, the jealous
mind ﬁnds not only a sign functioning as evidence, but also a vehicle
for translating the impossibility of repeated transgression into the possibility of rapid circulation. It is almost as if the handkerchief triggers in others
a desire to circulate and to replicate it in symbolic breaches of ﬁdelity. If
the audience is led to wonder when and why, exactly, Iago had “a hundred times / Woo’d” Emilia to steal the handkerchief, that question is not
so much answered as it is deﬂected (3.3.292–93). Emilia initially plans to
“have the work ta’en out” so that she can reproduce the handkerchief, but
36. Cavell, 133.
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this task is eventually given to Bianca, the courtesan who embodies the
circulation of female sexuality (3.3.296).
When Cassio gives Bianca the handkerchief with the request, “Take
me this work out,” the two are in the midst of a quarrel (3.4.180). Bianca
laments that Cassio has kept away from her for “seven days and nights,”
which she calculates as “[e]ightscore eight hours” (3.4.173–74). Cassio
accuses Bianca of jealousy; his later, misogynistic banter with Iago suggests that he ﬁnds it ludicrous that a courtesan might also have a proprietary sense of love. Yet the jealousy he attributes to Bianca converts the
rational time scheme of the plot into the impossible span of a week.
Bianca quickly abandons her impossible but precise reckoning of time,
declaring that subjective experience overwhelms any literal accounting:
“and lover’s absent hours, / More tedious than the dial eightscore times? /
O weary reck’ning!” (3.4.174–76). Bianca—deemed a merely sexual object by Cassio but still desiring to be beloved—gives voice to the unresolvable contradiction between objective reality and subjective distortions. For
Bianca as for Othello, an impossible time scheme exists to the extent that
the fantastical desire for permanence secured by love can lapse into the experience of jealousy.
VI

I close this essay by describing one way that Othello looks ahead to our
own concerns with political theology as a mode of relating the past to
the present. The play, I argue, can help us pinpoint the deﬁciencies of
Schmitt’s claims about Shakespearean tragedy in relation to history. In
the course of dramatizing the personal experience of jealousy as well as
its politico-theological effects, Othello presents the sea as a geographical
reality, as an imaginative or affective construct, and as something in between. This presentation of the sea exposes what Schmitt must deliberately ignore in his reading of Hamlet in order to arrogate the force of
tragedy for his view of so-called objective reality. Schmitt’s responses to
his interlocutor Walter Benjamin make clear some of the basic distortions
involved in the reading of Hamlet found in Hamlet or Hecuba. Benjamin
had argued in his study of allegory and trauerspiel that “Hamlet alone is
a spectator by the grace of God,” and that “Shakespeare was capable of
striking Christian sparks from the baroque rigidity of the melancholic.”37
37. Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, tr. John Osborn (London, 1985), 158.
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Reading Hamlet as Benjamin does would locate the source of its tragic
force in the tension between transcendence and the immanence of human
power. Schmitt subsequently works to strip Hamlet of the partially transcendent outlook that Benjamin attributes to him via Christian grace.38 In
order to reafﬁrm a historical narrative aiming towards modern, secularized
sovereignty, Schmitt explicitly declares that neither Hamlet nor Hamlet
are Christian in any meaningful sense. Conspicuous evidence to the contrary within the play must be denied or ignored.
Schmitt’s reading thus entirely overlooks Hamlet’s momentous sea
voyage—the interrupted voyage towards England that allows him to return to Denmark with a belief in providence. This oversight is not accidental. It serves to subordinate the drama of Hamlet to Schmitt’s claims
about historical reality, which rely on the ocean as an important explanatory device. As an island backwater, England lagged behind the Continent in the transition from a so-called barbarism to genuine politics.
Only in this context, Schmitt argues, could Hamlet have arisen as a tragedy of the monarchical sovereign’s legitimacy. Yet England’s belatedness
ultimately afﬁrms the forward thrust of history; England would cast off
its belated status by emerging as a global engine of modernity as an “overseas empire.”39 Before turning to Hamlet, Schmitt had already founded
his expansive study of the origins of modern European sovereignty
(the 1950 Nomos of the Earth), on the distinction between the land and
the anarchic sea. Schmitt bases his entire political history on the way “the
solid ground of the earth is delineated by fences . . . and other constructions” whereas the “sea knows no such apparent unity of space and
law.”40 In this opening gambit, we can discern how the sea operates as
a kind of mythic source of causation upon which Schmitt can base his
historical claims—including claims about English sovereignty as shaped
by England’s maritime existence. When, in Hamlet or Hecuba, he turns
to Shakespearean tragedy and its relationship to history, Schmitt maintains the validity of his mode of interpretation by ignoring one of the
most famous sea voyages in literary history—a criss-crossing not just between Denmark and England but also between an avowedly providential
view of the world and a proto-modern subjectivity. Schmitt’s understanding of political history and his reading of Hamlet work together to
38. See Schmitt, Hecuba, 26n15.
39. Schmitt, Hecuba, 65.
40. Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum,
tr. G.L. Ulmen (Candor, 2006), 42.
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suppress the fact that mythic and affective appeals anchor his supposedly
objective understanding of political history.
Othello does not let us forget that the sea is both a geographical reality
and a dramatic vehicle of experiences that are not reducible to national
history. On the shores of Cyprus, as we have seen, Othello transforms
his sea-crossing into a personal mythology of love frustrated and perfected.
Yet this dynamism between social fact and personal ﬁction is not contained
by a supposedly objective reality deﬁned around state power. Earlier, this
essay mentioned some differences between the Venice depicted in Othello
and the Venice described by Contarini. These differences underscore how
the play generates a tension between love and the political functions of
marriage. These distinctions illustrate how Shakespeare’s depiction of the
sea resists a state mythology built upon geographical reality. The Sposalizio
del Mare, the celebration of Venice’s marriage to the sea, was an important
civic ritual. By the 1260s, the annual blessing of the Adriatic Sea on Ascension Day (the Sensa) had evolved into a ceremony celebrating the marriage
of the Doge and the sea. By the sixteenth century, as Edward Muir puts it,
“the marriage of the sea was the carefully orchestrated apogee of the state
liturgy.”41 Contarini describes how the “prince” (as Lewkenor’s translation
refers to the doge) “throwing a ring of golde into the sea . . . doeth betroth
himselfe to the sea” (47). This ceremony turns the tenuous balance of love
and subservience within Christian marriage into a public afﬁrmation of the
doge’s benevolent dominion.
The relevance or irrelevance of the Sposalizio del Mare for Othello is an
old question among the play’s editors.42 Yet Lewkenor’s volume suggests
what might have been more important to an English readership than the
details of the pageant itself: Venice’s relationship to the sea reimagined as
a way to describe the transmission of knowledge back to the British Isles.
In a prefatory poem, John Astley depicts Venice not as the husband of the
sea but rather as a sea nymph whose “virgin state ambition nere could
blot”—at least for the time being. Now, Astley continues, “I prognosticate thy ruinous case / When thou shalt from thy Adriatique seas, / View
in this Ocean Isle thy painted face” (Contarini, *4v). Lewkenor’s own
dedicatory epistle likens Venice to “a beautifull virgine” who might take
umbrage at having her image depicted by “an unskilfull painter” (a standin for the self-abasing translator) (Contarini, *2). Unlike Astley, Lewkenor
41. Edward Muir, Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice (Princeton, 1981), 121.
42. See Furness’ Variorum edition, 34n31.
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does not describe England as a cosmetically enhanced version of Venice.
Instead, Lewkenor hopes that his dedicatee, Lady Anne (Russell) Dudley,
Countess of Warwick, might be the patroness of this abashed virgin so that
“she may have free and quiet passage” (Contarini, *2v). Perhaps Lewkenor presents virginal Venice as a metaphorical adoptive daughter for
Lady Anne, whose real-life marriage to Ambrose Dudley had produced
no offspring. In the process of translation, marriage has been transformed
from a mythic celebration of Venetian power to a metaphor for importing
knowledge of the Venetian republic back to England.
Between England and Venice, the sea functions as both a real and an
imaginative medium, with gendered or conjugal tropes transforming it
into a medium of cultural ﬁctions. Regardless of whether Shakespeare
speciﬁcally had the Marriage of the Sea in mind, we know that the sea
voyage was an original addition to the sources of Othello’s plot. The play
depicts the sea in a way that sunders political triumph from personal love.
Somewhere between the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, the sea wipes
out the Turkish ﬂeet and confers upon Venice a decisive victory. Yet this
same sea sunders Othello from Desdemona. After the perilous crossing,
Othello does not celebrate Venetian triumph but becomes solipsistic in
his desire for permanent love. Long after the plot of Othello moves away
from the shore, the metaphorical meanings of the sea persist in an internalized and affective form. In a study of the range of meanings associated
with the sea in Shakespeare’s writings, Steve Mentz labels Iago “the antiGod of the sea,” whose disruptive and wicked effects on Othello are
aligned with the “dissolving force of salt water.”43 In my own reading,
Iago nurtures a form of jealousy that heightens Othello’s antisocial reaction against what the sea has meant personally for him—for him as a husband rather than as a Venetian general and governor.
The resulting catastrophe is not durably tragic because of the intrusions of historical reality as Schmitt seeks to deﬁne them. Rather, Othello
achieves its tragic power by channeling theological patterns into a plot
of love entangled in profession, citizenship, and social belonging. Within
this unmistakably Christian tragedy, the sea begins to drive a wedge between shared political realities (a victory for Venice and Christendom)
and personal experience. Jealousy reveals the politico-theological contradictions that will make it impossible to restore a dynamic balance between
43. Steve Mentz, At the Bottom of Shakespeare’s Ocean (London, 2009), 26.
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the two registers. At the end of this tragedy, no political catharsis promises
to re-assimilate personal love into the expression of state power.
The central question is not, in other words, whether Othello invites
the newly crowned James I to perfect the synthesis of marriage’s political
functions and its spiritual and personal meanings. Schmitt’s account of
Shakespearean tragedy is located in a teleological narrative whereby
James’s attempt at divine kingship is doomed to fail—a failure that helps
to bring about the eventual shift towards modern power. Shakespeare
would go on in The Winter’s Tale to treat jealousy as a problem arising
out of and imperiling hereditary monarchy. Yet as Pye shows, this problem does not afﬁrm Schmitt’s political history but rather embeds a problem
for his theory of the sovereign decision. My own reading has suggested
that Othello shares with Cymbeline’s Imogen a desire for individual permanence within love—a desire that the threat of the sea intensiﬁes. Imogen’s
story ends in comedy rather than tragedy because her marriage is freed
from the demands of succession and of political history. For both Othello
and Imogen, a sea crossing divorces individual feeling from state triumph.
The results can be tragic or tragicomic, but there is no recourse to a state
that can arrogate the enabling ﬁctions of personal love for its own myths
of perpetuation. Othello constructs upon Christian marriage and biblical
jealousy a dramatic structure in which the supervenience of state power
is felt as tragic. This is not tantamount to the kind of breakdown that
advances a linear politico-theological narrative. The fact that intimate
experience is not the same as communal truth—that the personal is enmeshed in but not identical to the political—contains a tragic potential,
yet tragedy also preserves this slippage by elevating it. Othello does not
allow our impression of Othello and Desdemona to dissolve into an afﬁrmation of the continuity of Venetian power. The New Testament’s redeﬁnition of Christian marriage contains within it tensions between the
individual and the collective, between love and sacriﬁce, between the literal and its higher meaning. Through jealousy, Othello shapes this religious
structure into a dramatic and affective encounter that no story of state
power can claim for itself.
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